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A CONSIDERABLE number of words have been
spoken and written about the United States balance-
of-payments problem, and in the last two mnonths vig-
orous steps have been taken to correct the deep and
persistent deficit. However, both before and after the
mid-August actions, explanations of the causes of our
balance-of-payments difficulties have varied widely.
And, as one would expect, these different explana-
tions have led to a variety of conclusions as to the
appropriate cure. Unfortunately, many of these sug-
gested courses have involved the pursuit of partial
and specific targets, rather than focusing more broadly
on the multilateral dimensions of the problem. I be-
lieve we must look to these broader aspects if we are
to achieve lasting inmprovement.
Among the more specific targets for action to re-
duce the deficit have been the following:
Military expenditures abroad: How cami the level
be reduced? How big a premium should be paid
for procurement in the U.S.?
Private capital outflows: How much restraint should
be imposed 0mm purchases of foreign securities, omm
direct investmneut, and ou U.S. bank lending abroad?
Unfair trading practices of foreign countries: What
are the best ways to reduce barriers which discrim-
inate against U.S. exports.
am indebted to several members of the Board’s staff for
assistance in the preparation of these remarks, especially to
Mr. Samuel Pizer, Miss Kathryn A. Morisse, and Mrs. Betty
L, Barker.
Among the more generalized targets have
the following:
been
Inflation in the United States: How can excess de-
mand be curbed to help check deterioration in our
trade account?
Structural changes and foreign competition: How
can we cope with modernization amid productivity
improvements abroad which enhance time ability of
foreign countries to comnpete in merchandise trade
with the United States?
Exchange rate adjustment: Can exchange rate ad-
justments be envisaged that would contribute sig-
nificantly to improving the U.S. competitive position?
Cutting across these categories, tile point is often
made (usually in connection with an analysis of mer-
chandise trade flows) that our increasing deficits can
be traced to transactions with a few countries or
regions. Usually Japan and Canada are singled out.
It is then suggested that we should concentrate our
efforts on imnproving our situation with those countries
in particular.
Clearly we are dealing with a mnost complex — if
not the nmost complex — problem in economic analysis
and policy making. Much could be said about each of
the factors or types of international transactions listed.
Yet, a clear lesson to he learned from the collapse of
the payments system this year is that there are many
factors at \vork — each of which on the surface can be
biamned for a large part of our deficits of tile last few
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years. In fact, if we added up the separate effects of
these different factors, we svouid quickly come to a
sum that greatly exceeds our deficits. Furthermore,
concentration on one aspect at a time tends to lead
to policy prescriptions that are clearly inadequate.
More importantly, we nmay be misled into the adop-
tion of direct controls or other protectionist devices
that can only hamper trade in the long run.
Given the comnplexity of our balance-of-payments
difficulties, and in light of the current efforts to bring
about a fundamental correction of the deficit, we
should strive to increase our understanding of as many
dimnensions of the problem as we possibly can. One
way of contributing to this understanding is to look in
some depth at our transactions with various regions
or countries and at the overall, international trans-
actions of those regions.There are at least two reasons
supporting such an approach. These relationships are
intrinsically important, and there is a need to look at
them more broadly than in terms of the trade accounts
alone. There is also a need to recognize that adjust-
ment of the U.S. balance of payments involves for
each of these countries or regions, not just a change
in the bilateral relationship with the United States,
but a many-sided adjustment involving their positions
vis-à-vis the rest of the world as a whole.
With this objective in mind, and without attempting
a detailed analysis of trends in U.S. trade and finan-
cial relations with major foreign countries and areas,
a brief review has been made of the regional pattern
of our trade and service transactions and of long-term
private capital flows. The results of the analysis are
presented in the following sections, but a summary
can be sketched here:
The persistent deficit in our overall balance of pay-
ments (which reached an annual rate of some $20
billion in the first six months of this year) was the
result of a fundamental deterioration in our com-
petitive position which showed no signs of being
checked. At mid-year, the outlook was for a further
worsening in 1972. Thus, a striking change in the
international competitive enviromunent was called for.
The measures announced by the United States on
August 15 were directed at that objective.
Among the major countries and regions of the
world, there is naturally a primary interest in our
trade and payments relations \vith those countries en-
joying sizable surpluses — particularly Canada, Japan,
and Germany. In what follows, I will focus on trends
in the current and long-term capital accounts so as to
avoid the wide fluctuations in the flows of short-term
capital.
With respect to Canada, a striking and lasting change
has occurred in the United States-Canadian bilateral
relationship since the early 1960’s. In 1970, the over-
all U.S. deficit with Canada amounted to $1.7 billion,
compared with a surplus of $0.8 hillion in 1964.
Indeed, Canada’s overall position in the world eco-
nomy has improved dramatically, and a substantial
share of the gain has centered in its trade with the
United States. A significant part of this strengthening
is a result of the United States-Canadian automobile
agreement. In the quest to correct the deficit in the
U.S. balance of payments, it may be appropriate to
remove the restrictions on exports of U.S. automobiles
to Canada contained in the 1965 agreement.
In the case of Japan, the U.S. bilateral deficit
amounted to $1.6 billion last year; in 1964 the deficit
was much smaller, under $100 million, These grow-
ing deficits with Japan reflected spurts in U.S. im-
ports. While voluntary quotas have moderated the
rate of expansion in our deficit with Japan, the
latter’s restrictions on imports have hampered poten-
tial U.S. exports to an even greater degree. Conse-
quently, a reduction of Japanese barriers to U.S.
trade must be a principal objective of the cun’ent
negotiations to rebuild the payments system.
The United States overall balance of payments with
Western Europe registered a sum’plus of nearly $1
billion in 1970. In 1964, our accounts were in deficit
by $160 million. However, in the first six months of
this year, we recorded a deficit of $1.6 billion with
Western Europe. Almost half of that total was with
the European Economic Community (EEC). The
noticeable deterioration in the U.S. balance of pay-
ments with Western Europe in the last year or so
reflected the waning of favorable capital flows and
the passing of the fortuitous benefits to our trade
from cyclical developments here and abroad. More
fundamentally, however, the greatly strengthened
position of Western Europe can be traced to a basic
change in its competitive stance vis-à-vis the United
States,
Changes in the U.S. bilateral balance of payments
with other countries have been far less dramatic,
There was no significant change in our position with
respect to other developed countries (Australia, New
Zealand, and South Africa) between 1964 and 1970.
In the case of developing nations, the major change
in flows vis-à-vis the United States has been an in-
crease in the amount of long-terrmm private capital they
have received — which rose from $1 billion in 1964
to 81.6 billion last year. U.S. trade with these areas
has remained virtually static since the early 1960’s,
showing an annual U.S. surplus of about $1.5 billion.
The bilateral balance of payments of the United
States with other regions can show only a part of
the overall paymnents situation which they face. We
mmmst look at their surplus or deficit position with the
rest of the world if we are to evaluate the extent to
which they could or shommld adjust their external
transactions as part of their contribution to rebuild-
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ing the international payments system. Such a review
shows that the nmajor countries which have large
surpluses with the United States (particularly Can-
ada, Germany and Japan) also have overall surpluses
with the rest of the world. However, taking all the
leading industm-ial countries as a group, it is clear
that they will have to withstand a sizable diminu-
tion in their aggregate surpluses if the United States
is to make meaningfi.ml progress in correcting its own
deficit.
Regional Dimensions of the
tJ~S.Balance of Payments
The published data on the U.S. balance of payments
enable one to trace our transactions with major foreign
countries and areas. These data are summarized in
Tables I and 11.1 Our overall balance on trade, serv-
ices, and long-term private capital transactions (some-
times called the “basic” balance) has been nearly al-
ways in deficit since 1960— and generally on a rising
scale. By 1970, this underlying deficit was $3 billion
and in the first half of 1971, it reached $4.8 billion (not
an annual rate). This latest increase may have been
exaggerated somewhat by the strikes then in effect or
threatened and by changes in the timing of payments
as traders and investors moved to protect themselves
against the unstable international monetary situation.
But the basic worsening was unmistakable, and projec-
tions for 1972 indicated that a further worsening was
in store unless a striking change in the international
competitive environment was brought about.
The worsening trend appeared in most major cate-
gories of transactions. Our trade balance moved into
an almost unprecedented deficit position in April, and
in the April-August period the United States ran a
tmNote on Trade Data, Tables I, H, III, and IV.
Data in Table IV are reported on the same basis as in
Table I and Table II (e.g., balance-of-payments basis — exports
and imports fob.).
The trade data reported in Table III differ from data in
Tables I, II, and IV because:
1. Imports in Table Ill are derived from export data as
reported by the partner exporting countries. For exam-
ple, exports of the United States tn Canada are also,
by dehrmition, Canadian imports from the United
States. These derived Canadian imports will differ
from Canadian imports as reported in Canadian trade
statistics.
2. Export data in Table III are adjusted by the United
Nations to conform to UT’. standards.
3. Western Europe’s trade balances with the United
States, Canada, and Japan, as shown hi Table III,
appear to be consistent with those shown in other
sources, However, Western Europe’s trade balances with
the rest of the world, as derived from the United
Nations data, differ markedly from those shown in
other sources, and these differences have not yet been
reconciled.
deficit at an annual rate of over $4 billion. Private
long-term capital registered a moderate net outflow of
$1.5 billion in 1970; but in the first six months of this
year, the net outflow totaled $3.3 billion, The net out-
flow associated witim U.S. Government economic grants
and capital flows also rose somewhat, The exception
to this trend was a considerable rise in U.S. net re~
ceipts from service transactions, mainly because of an
improvement in net income receipts. This rise was
also to a considerable extent a temporary bulge re-
lated to some special transactions.
Having sketched in the overall trends in these major
accounts, let us now turn to the trends in our dealings
with some of the major regions of the world.
Canada: Between 1964 and 1970, our overall trade
balance deteriorated by $4.7 billion. Of this amount,
$2.5 billion was in trade with Canada. About $1.2
billion of the change in the U.S. trade balance with
Canada was in automobiles, trucks, and parts. How-
ever, even apart from this special factor, U.S. trade
with Canada worsened by over $1 billion during the
1964-70 period. The further worsening in 1970 (apart
from automnohiies) resulted from a sizable increase in
U.S. imports, while exports to Canadarose only slightly
because of the weakness of the Canadian economy.
In the first half of this year, the U.S. trade balance
with Canada again declined substantially, as the defi-
cit ran at an annual rate of nearly $2 billion. One
might have expected that reduced trade balances
with Canada would have been offset by increases in
other current account transactions, especially net in-
vestment income. Yet, net receipts from these trans-
actions have grown very slowly and have been only
a minor offset to the losses on trade account.
The flow of private long-term capital to Canada
has been relatively free from restraints, but the volume
has shown no tendency to rise since the middle-1960’s.
In fact, the outflow was relatively small in the first
half of this year (roughly $230 million). In consid-
erable part, the slowdowmi iu these flows reflects ef-
forts by the Canadian Government to reduce the
dependence of Canadian borrowers on the U.S. capi-
tal nmarket.
Looking ahead, as the pace of economic activity
picks up both in Canada and in the United States,
our trade balance with Canada should improve. How-
ever, the net outflow of private capital will probably
expand also. The rise in the exchange rate for the
Canadian dollar should help the trade balance to
become less unfavorable for the United States, Over
the longer run, the bilateral trade balance may also
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annual rate of perhaps $2.8 billion in the first half of
1971, These growing deficits reflected spurts in U.S.
imports. Voluntaty quotas imposed by Japan have
kept the trade deficit from growing even faster. On
the other hand, Japan’s restrictions on imports have
reduced potential U.S. exports, perhaps by an even
larger amount.
The United States also has a deficit with Japan in
the non-trade sectors of the current account, mainly
direct military expenditures. This deficit also has risen
over the period from about $100 million in 1964 to
about $300 million in 1970. Moreover, there has been
a rising private long-term capital outflow to Japan,
\vhieh ivould probably be substantially larger if me-
stiictions were not imposed by both countries, These
outflows rose sharply to nearly $0.5 billion in the first
half of this year, probably reflecting expectations of a
Japanese revaluation. In 1970, Japan’s overall surplus
on current and long-term capital transactions with the
United States was about $1.6 billion, compared to a
surplus less than one-third as large in 1965. In the first
half of 1971, these transactions resulted in a U.S.
deficit of nearly $2 billion with Japan, Although
tins total was inflated by anticipatory transactions of
various kinds, the underlying trend was clearly and
sharply adverse to the United States.
Western Europe; After averaging deficits of about
$350 million annually in 1964-67, the U.S. balance with
Europe on current account and long-term capital was
transformed into a surplus of $2 billion in 1963, The
shift was due mainly to the impact of the tightening
of U.S. controls on private capital outflows. After that,
however, the surpluses diminished, and in the first six
months of this year, we registered a deficit of $1.6
billion in these transactions with Western Europe.
On trade account alone, the surplus with Western
Europe dipped very sharply from 1964 through 1968.
Subsequently it recovered markedly as the rise in U.5.
imports slowed dosvn while strong demand in Europe
supported a steep rise in U.S. exports to those coun-
tries. Tile cyclical situation as between the United
States and major European countries was especially
favorable for the U.S. trade balance in 1970, raising
the surplus to $2.9 billion — not far from the peak of
1964, However, over the coming year, as the United
States moves toward snore vigorous growth, at a time
when output in the European countries will probably
be lagging, some reduction in the trade balance is to
be expected. Already in the first half of this year, the
U.S. surplus in trade with Europe was only about
$1.25 billion at an annual rate.
The picture of U.S. transactions with Europe is
significantly different when the whole current account
is taken into consideration. On this basis, the U.S.
position is noticeably weaker, The balance deterior-
ated by nearly $2 billion between 1964 and 1970. Of
this amount, $0.5 billion was in merchandise trade, and
almost $1.5 billion related to current transactions other
than trade with Enrope. Principal among these were
larger deficits in tourism, rising military expenditures,
and reduced net receipts on investment income
(especially in 1969 and 1970) due to larger interest
payments from the United States on accumulating
debt.
More than offsetting the worsening of current trans-
actions \vith Europe from 1964 to 1970 was the sharp
improvement in the private long-term capital accounts.
These long-term capital flows shifted from a net out-
flow to Europe of about $2.1 billion in 1964 to a net
outflow of only $0.7 billion in 1966 (after voluntary
restraints on capital outflows \vere installed) and to a
net inflow of about $3.5 billion in 1968 (when man-
datory controls on certain capital flows were initiated) -
After that the net inflow of capital from Europe
diminished, although it still remained at about $1
billion in 1970. This year private long-term capital
has again been flowing to Europe from the United
States on an enormous scale, despite the restrictions.
The principal featnre of the change in capital flows
betiveen the United States and Europe during the
1964-70 period was the dramatic increase in European
investments in U.S. corporate securities and other obli-
gations. This trend began in 1965, svhen the United
States started a voluntary program to reduce the
outflow of U.S. funds for direct investments abroad.
The appeal induced U.S. corporations to seek financing
in Europe, although the amounts involved were rela-
tively small until 1968. In that year, the inflow of
private capital from Europe (apart from short-term
funds) rose to $4.5 billion, from less than $1.5 billion
in 1967. The improvement reflected the combined
unpact of a tightening of the direct investment con-
trols and stepped-up European purchases of U.S.
stocks in a rising market. However, the inflow has
slackened since then to about $3.5 billion in 1970 and
to less than $1 billion in the first half of 1971.
At the mnoment, the outlook for capital inflows from
Europe is clouded by many uncertainties, not least of
which is the anticipation of exchange rate changes.
European purchases of U.S. corporate stocks have
dwindled. In any case, after the major portfolio ad-
justment that occurred in 1968-69 (with the help of
vigorous marketing efforts by investment funds) the
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“normal” level of inflows could be expected to he
considerably smaller. U.S. corporations have found it
more difficult to sell long-term debt abroad and in-
stead have turned to shorter-term financing for their
foreign affiliates, European direct investments in the
United States had been rising until recently, and they
probably will do so again once the international finan-
cial environment has settled.
Flows of U.S. private long-term capital to Europe
have been held down by the controls, The steep in-
crease in plant and equipment expenditures of Euro-
pean affiliates of U•S, companies (from $2 billion in
1968 to a projected $4.4 billion next year) has been
largely financed from foreign sources. Banks have re-
duced their credits to Europe under the Voluntary
Foreign Credit Restraint Program, and the growth of
the European bond market has relieved demands on
U.S. capital markets — not only fromn European bor-
rowers but also from Canadians and others.
To sum up this brief review, the improvement in
the U.S. bilateral balance with Europe in 1970 de-
pended mainly on a favorable shift in capital flows that
at mid-year was already showing signs of diminishing
and on an enlarged trade surplus that reflected in
large part a favorable cyclical situation. Even though
temporary factors may have contributed a good deal
to the abrupt worsening in these trade and capital
transactions with Europe so far this year, the under-
lying trend was clearly adverse.
Other countries: United States bilateral balances
with other developed countries (Australia, New Zea-
land, and South Africa) did not shift significantly
between 1964 and 1970, As for the developing coun-
tries, the principal change in flows vis-à-vis the U.S.
has been an increase in the outflow of private capital
to them in the last few years. The U.S. trade balance
with developing nations has been nearly static since
the early 1960’s, showing an annual US. surplus of
about $1.5 billion,
Overall Position of Major Regions
The preceding review of the bilateral position of
the United States with various regions, in terms of
the balance on current account and long-term flows
of private capital, can show only a part of the overall
payments situation facing each of these regions. It is
only by looking at their overall surpluses or deficits
that we can evaluate the extent to which they could
or should adjust their external transactions. In effect,
the U.S. disequilibrium is the sum of the global dis-
equffibria of other countries. So, when we speak of the
adjustment that is needed from the U.S. point of view,,
we are really speaking about some sizable fraction of,
say, the overall German surplus, rather than being con-
cerned only with the German position vis-à-vis the
United States.
The most accessible body of data on country-by-
country transactions relates to international trade. But
it has not been possible to develop an accurate set
of regional flows because of discrepancies in country
statistics. A matrix of regional trade flows has been
constructed as a starting point for discussion (Table
III). However, it can only be used to indicate tenden-
cies over the period and is less accurate for any given
counfry than the data given in Table IV. Based on
the United Nations data used in the matrix, the
Canadian trade balance improved from a bare surplus
of $0.3 billion in 1965 to $3•7 billion in 1970, Of this
$3.4 billion improvement, $2.7 billion came through
trade with the United States, Canada’s trade balance
with Europe also improved substantially (by about
$600 million), and Canada even recorded an improve-
ment in tradewith Japan. Evidently, the Canadiangain
was broadly based, although the brunt of the improve-
ment fell on the United States.
Japan’s trade balance rose about $2 billion between
1965 and 1970. About half of the 1965-70 gain in
trade was with the United States, a little over 35 per
cent with Western Europe, and another 15 per cent
with other countries. Of particular interest in the case
of Japan is the sharp upsurge in the export surplus
since mid-1970, In the last half of 1970, Japanese net
exports jumped to an annual rate of over $5 billion,
and the rate reached $5.7 billion in the first half of
1971 (Table IV). Although trade with the United
States accounted for about 40 per cent of Japan’s
overall trade surplus in 1970, a larger share of the
gain in 1971 seems to be in trade with this country.
However, there have been several factors operating
recently to bring about a temporary surge in Japan’s
balance with us. American and Japanese traders were
probably attempting to anticipate strikes in the United
States and to avoid being caught in a yen revaluation,
while at the same time the Japanese economy has
been going through a period of slowdown at home.
Although the U.N. data show a large overall trade
deficit for Western Europe as a whole, country data
suggest that (apart from a deficit with the United
States) Europe probably has a surplus with the rest
of the world. The trade positions of the individual
European countries vary widely. These country bal-
ances have been assembled in Table IV. Among Euro-
pean countries, Germany has by far the strongest
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they can also be misleading as ndicators of a country s
overall surplus or deficit. For some countncs, there are 6142 187
significant current account tran actions apart f om the moe 5.1 955
trade accounts. Foi instance statistics on current ac- t~ 1 sts
count balanc s in Table V show that much of Gcr- ~ a 1 I so 2 91* many s large trade surplus is offset by other current
payments to foreigners — especially xc ages to foreign SO
work rs in Germany tourist expenditures and private .~
remittances. Thus although Germany had ‘t tnde ~146
surplus of $5.8 billion in 1970 that country s current wt*søos* 4 4
account surplus was only $1.7 billion. For Japan also. re 8
a large part of the trade surplus is offset by net pay- 1~ 14:
ments on other current tr’mnsactions. On the other wedea. 22
hand nearly all European countries except Germany
d nyc substantial net receipts from current transac- ° ‘
tions apart from trade — with tourist receipts often a
inajol source of income. These other receipts ae naal MO a to a
especially important for the United Kingdom Austria
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creased their reserves con-
As shown in Table VI, between 1965 and 1970, the
net official reserves of the world’s principal industrial
countries (other than the United States) rose almost
40 per cent — from $33 billion to $45 billion, Some of
this gain (about $1.3 billion) represented allocations
of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs). However, most of
it was associated with the U.S. deficit on the official
reserve transactions basis, which totaled $9.5 billion
for the period. Reserves of the countries constituting
the European Economic Community (EEC) increased
by over $5 billion — apart from SDR allocations. Most
of the expansion was concentrated in Gennany, which
gained about $6 billion. On the other hand, France
was a major net loser of reserves ($2.2 billion) for
that period as a whole.
siderably. Although the U.S.
deficit on officialtransactions
was quite large, U.S. reserve
losses xvere held down to
under $2 billion. The U.S.
deficits were financed largely
by borrowing.
In 1971, of course, there
has been an enormous in-
crease in reserves of foreign
countries — a rise of about
$20 billion through August,
and an additional but rela-
tively minor gain has been
registered since then. The
published U.S. balance-of-
payments datacover onlythe
first half of the year, when
the officialsettlements deficit
reached $12 billion. How-
ever, from the figures show-
ing changes in official re-
In my opinion, the size of these reserve gains is not
really representative of the size of the U.S. imbalance.
It will be recalled that a dominant feature of the
three-month period prior to August 15 was a massive
floxv of liquid funds into those currencies that were
thought to be the best candidates for appreciation.
This flow included foreign funds previously held in
dollar-denominated assets in the United States (mainly
represented by borrowings by U.S. banks through their
foreign branches) as well as outflows of U.S. funds
either into foreign currencies or into high-yielding
Eurodollar deposits. However, our discussion of the
basic balance-of-payments position of the United
States has shown that the situation was not merely
a transitory crisis of confidence. Instead, the funda-
mental weakness in our trade and other transactions
also had much to do with the deteriorating environ-
ment. The cumulative impact of these difficulties was
labia VI
NJet Official Reserves’
m Ions of eeliar~,not seasoi,a”y ad I,. ~od
Arnounts~ . Chant —
Yror end 1971 Years 19/1
965 19/0 Match Aag..st 1966-70 Jan-Aug
Grrn,an’
1
7,431 13,610 15.802 18,713 - 5,97/ . 2,932
Italy 4,800 5.299 6,024 6.520 394 - 1,114
Netocrbanec 2.436 3,234 3,542 3.505 731 196
France 6,343 4,3.51 ‘.881 7.622 2,158 3,316
Beg i,rn-L,.x 2,33/ 2.854 3.081 3.451 .443 i
EEC (23,32?) (29,348) 133,3301 ç31.817~ C ‘5,38/I C 7.884)
U&tea K nydam 1.097 995 2.1/6 4 3 C 509 ‘ 3 012
Carodc 3.037 4,6/9 2,845 4,992 1.518 195
Japan 2,152 4.839 ~,898 1 ~.5I4 2,565 - 7,547
Swfle,baro 3,.,44 5,132 4.623 6,581 .688 -~1,449
TOTAL a’ above, cDuntries 33,057 14,996 50,872 66.214 ‘ 30,649 - 20,08/
Linltdd Stoter
reserve assets 15,450 1 ‘.487 14.342 12 128 1.830 3.0/6
0 ff,cia~setteme n ts
ba!ance 9,544 i1,884~
-‘ .1.-,-—. sIlt •. I :~‘ii I —
3.’.’i, i,iIc. n.,
‘‘ii.,. I. , ,,—Iiit ‘I .. ‘. I - 1
‘I
counted for by norm-il transactions. These flows may serves of leading foreign countries, it is evident that
sometimes be outright flows of liquid funds from one the U.S. deficits in the last fexv months were enormous.
currency to another, or they may take the form of Gains in reserves this year have been spread among
shifting the timing of delivery or payment for ordmaiy many nations — most noticeably Germany, France, the
commercial or financial transactions. Perhaps the best United Kingdom and Japan. But other countries also
way to illustrate the size and direction, not only of had sizable increases relative to their total reserve
these volatile capital flows hut also the impact of the holdings. By the end of August, net official reserves of
other trends we have been discussing, is to examine these major countries had reached $66 billion, coni-
changes in countries’ reserve positions. pared to $12 billion of reserves held by the United
States. At the end of August, both Germany and Japan
had larger reserves than the United States.
Other major reserve gainers in the 1966-70 period
were Canada ($1.5 billion), Japan ($2.6 billion), and
Sxvitzerland ($l..7 billion). In addition, some of tile
non-industrialized countries not discussed here in-
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too great to permit us to continue the pursuit of the
same balance-of-payments policies.
Exchange Rates and Multilateral Adjustment
Once the need for a change in policy was recog-
nized, there could be no doubt that a large adjustment
in the U.S. accounts was necessary. It was also clear
that the adjustment would have to be distributed over
a considerable number of countries. Part of the ad-
justment question involves specific actions to lessen
discriminations against U.S. goods in world trade and
a more equitable sharing of the burden of defense
outlays.
More lastingly, however, there would have to he
major changes in relative shares of xvorld trade that
could be brought about over time only by some ad-
justment in exchange rates. We could no longer see
any reasonable possibility of effecting such changes
through monetary and fiscal policies to control domes-
tic inflation. There was simply too much lost ground
to be regained.
From the United States’ point of view, we are inter-
ested in a constellation of exchange rates that — along
with other measures in the trade and burden-sharing
areas — assures elimination of our deficit and provides
a safety margin over time, A key to this outcome is
a surplus on current account — which will have to
center mainly in a surplus on trade account.
Ia msure there xvill be agreement on at least one
fact: no one can possibly estimate with any accuracy
the effects on a particular country of the multiplicity
of modifications in relative exchange rates and other
features of the international monetary system that
are currently at issue.
This very difficulty of seeing clearly what the effects
of such changes ivill be in the months and years ahead
is a strong argument, in my opinion, for allowing more
flexibility of exchange rates than we have had during
the last 25 years. Most of the key industrial countries
seem to agree that some increased flexibility is a
necessary feature of the new international monetary
system that will emerge from the present negotia-
tions. However, the crux of the issue turns on the
extent to which those countries with sizable trade
surpluses are prepared to see these balances shaved
somewhat as part of the multilateral effort to make
the payments mechanism function with a reasonable
degree of predictability and efficiency.
In my personal opinion, as I have stated previously,
the most urgent requirement at the present time is for
a wider understanding among the major industrial
nations with respect to the fundamental goals of the
payments system, and for a better coordination of na-
tional goals in the areas of international trade, invest-
ment, and assistance to the developing countries. The
efforts to negotiate new exchange rates and to promote
institutional changes are obviously necessary. But I
remain less than optimistic about the long-run viabil-
ity of such arrangements unless there is a broad con-
census on goals. The recent Annual Meeting of the
International Monetary Fund did result in some move-
ment in that direction, in that ten of its principal
industrial members agreed on a list of priorities for
negotiation and a plan of work over the months ahead.
However, the tough issues of exchange rate adjust-
ment and the reduction of trade barriers remain to
be resolved. If we are successful in resolving these
issues and also in producing fundamental improve-
ments in the payments system. the benefits of in-
creased international trade and investment would he
considerable.
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